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INTRODUCTION

Bankers are fond of telling the story about the hapless guarantor of a promissory note who, upon default of the maker, was called
upon to pick up the note. "Oh, I didn't sign the note to pay it," he
replied, "I just signed it so my friend could get the money." Security
interests in personal property are given, and taken, for much the
same reason-not to be invoked but to facilitate the sale or loan.
Indeed, with the exception of the pawnbroker, lenders and condiA.B., Duke University, 1963; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1966. Member,
Tennessee Bar.
*
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tional sellers extend credit on the expectation of repayment.' Even
in times of economic recession and tight money most debtors pay
their creditors more or less on time and without significant prodding.
Still, prudent sellers and lenders frequently take or retain security interests to protect themselves against the occasional default
that the law of averages dictates will occur. A security interest is
useful to the creditor even if he does not actually seek recourse
against the collateral. It protects the creditor by insulating the
debtor's assets from the claims of other creditors or his trustee in
bankruptcy. The threat of enforcement of the security agreement
serves as a psychological weapon to force the debtor to pay as
agreed, and covenants in the security agreement may be used to
exercise control over the debtor's operations. Nevertheless, the creditor occasionally must attempt to realize on his collateral in order
to avoid certain loss. The rights and duties of a creditor who reaches
this unhappy conclusion form the subject matter of this Article.
The scope of this Article is limited to a discussion of the enforcement of consensual' liens under the Uniform Commercial Code
as enacted in title 47 of the Tennessee Code. 3 It does not include the
panoply of other, nonconsensual remedies such as prejudgment attachment and postjudgment levy. In particular, this Article examines the applicability of the doctrine of election of remedies, the
mechanics of repossession, and the rules applicable to the disposition of collateral, primarily as these concepts have been interpreted
and applied by the courts of Tennessee.
II.

PRESERVATION OF IN PERSONAM RIGHTS AGAINST THE DEBTOR

A.

Election of Remedies

In the typical secured transaction, the debtor obligates himself
personally to the creditor and also grants to him a security interest
in certain collateral. The question arises from time to time whether
the creditor may proceed against both the collateral and the debtor
personally, or whether the creditor must choose one of the two remedies. In Tennessee the creditor clearly need not make an election of
1. "Assuring repayment of the indebtedness, and not realization upon the collateral, is
the main object of any sensible lender." 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOOAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 863 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
COOGAN].

2. Some attention is given to the arguably nonconsensual lien or right to reclaim under
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-702 (1964). See text accompanying notes 58-72 infra.
3, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 47 (1964).

19771

TENNESSEE CODE REMEDIES

1199

mutually exclusive remedies. He can foreclose on the collateral and
sue the debtor, although obviously he is entitled only to one satisfaction of his claim.
At common law respectable authority supported the proposition that a conditional vendor of a chattel forfeits his right to sue
on the debt if he repossesses the collateral; retaking of possession
was an election among inconsistent remedies.' Some courts avoided
the election issue by reluctantly allowing sellers to enforce explicit
contract provisions that permitted both repossession and deficiency
suits.5 The narrow common law rule, however, is not part of Tennessee jurisprudence.' The doctrine of election of remedies in secured
transactions is rejected definitively by section 47-9-504(2) of the
Tennessee Code, which permits both foreclosure and a deficiency
judgment, even if the security agreement does not explicitly provide
for deficiency judgments:
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must
account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor
is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale of
accounts, contract rights, or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus
or is liable for any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides.7

Under a recent Tennessee statute, however, the creditor's initial
choice of remedies does have some impact on the subsequent availability of additional relief. Tennessee law now provides that the cred4. See, e.g., Russell v. Martin, 232 Mass. 379, 122 N.E. 447 (1919); cf. Washington
Cooperative Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, 42 Wash. 2d 460, 256 P.2d 294 (1953) (vendor may either
sue on the debt or repossess, but not both). For a textual discussion of election of remedies,
see 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREsTs INPERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.6 (1965). See also Glenn,
The ConditionalSale at Common Law and as a Statutory Security, 25 VA. L. REv. 559, 56974 (1939). The theory was that repossession resulted in rescission of the sale, whereas suit on
the indebtedness confirmed title in the buyer.
5. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. Briles, 137 Fla. 268, 188 So. 222 (1939).
6. Turner v. Brock, 53 Tenn. (1 Heisk.) 50 (1871). A number of states, but not Tennessee, recently have restricted by statute the right of a creditor with a security interest in
consumer goods to repossess and resell, and then collect a deficiency judgment. See, e.g.,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50A-9-504(2) (Supp. 1971).
7. This conclusion is reinforced by TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-501(1) (1964), which specifically makes rights and remedies cumulative. Accord, Williams v. Westinghouse Credit Corp.,
250 Ark. 1065, 468 S.W.2d 761 (1971). If the plaintiff elects to proceed against the collateral
by action, he is virtually encouraged by the statute to sue for possession and damages:
In an action to recover personal property, in addition to the recovery of the property,
the plaintiff may proceed to recover the balance due on the debt or the plaintiff may, in
addition to recovering the personal property, obtain a judgment against the defendant
for any debt or other claim arising out of the same transaction or set of circumstances,
or the plaintiff may proceed solely for recovery of the personal property with the right
to seek a judgment for additional relief in a subsequent action.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-2348 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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itor who avails himself of an "action to recover personal property" s
(the statutory successor to the unconstitutional replevin statute)'
may sue both for possession and on the instrument or contract, but
"no deficiency judgment shall be obtained by the plaintiff(s) until
plaintiff(s) shall have complied with all requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code applicable thereto."' 0 Apparently these requirements are the disposition-of-collateral provisions of part 5 of
Article 9." This statute requires the plaintiff who forecloses by process to liquidate the collateral before he takes any action toward a
personal judgment against the debtor. Presumably the "deficiency"
or in personam portion of the action lies dormant in the bosom of
the court between the filing of the suit and liquidation of the collateral. No such stricture against personal judgments applies when the
collateral is taken by self-help.
B.

Discharge by Impairment of Collateral

An important defense available to debtors and their sureties in
actions brought against them personally by creditors is commonly
referred to as "discharge by impairment of collateral." This term is
used to refer to two different courses of action that cause discharge
of the debtor's personal liability: (1) impairment of the collateral
itself by the creditor without the consent of the debtor or surety, and
(2) impairment of recourse against the collateral. An example of the
first defense occurs when the creditor allows the collateral to deteriorate in value. In the second case, the creditor might allow the
debtor to use the collateral in a manner rendering recourse against
it meaningless. Such conduct discharges a surety who presumably
relied on the value of the collateral when he guaranteed the debt,
since the collateral would cushion any loss he might suffer by paying
the debt.
This second type of impairment also occurs when the creditor
fails to perfect his security interest in the collateral, thereby exposing it to a competing claim of a security interest by another creditor.
When the third-party claim against the collateral prevails over the
secured party's claim, the guarantor's exposure obviously is in8. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2341 to -2351 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
9. See text accompanying notes 32-34 infra.
10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-2348. The statute originally was drafted by a committee of
the Tennessee Bankers Association in response to the decision in Mitchell v. Tennessee, 351
F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). The provision quoted in the text was not a part of the draft
bill, but was added on the floor of the General Assembly.
11. See text accompanying notes 35-42 infra for a discussion of the mechanics of the
statute.
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creased, and accordingly the2 guarantor is discharged to the extent
of the value of the security.'
The prudent creditor can avoid these discharges by obtaining
the consent of the debtor or surety who otherwise would be discharged. This consent may be obtained before, at the time of, or
after the conduct in question.' 3 The consent commonly is found
buried in the boiler-plate of a written security agreement.'4 Furthermore, a number of cases hold that failure to perfect a security interest does not ipso facto constitute an impairment of collateral giving
rise to a discharge.'" Nor does impairment of collateral discharge
any one other than an accommodation party.
The Tennessee courts generally have followed a middle course
in applying the rule of discharge by impairment of collateral. In the
leading case of Commerce Union Bank v. May 6 a surety argued that
his obligation on a promissory note was discharged by the creditor
bank's failure to renew an insurance policy on a parcel of land that
served as collateral for a loan. Although the case involved liability
on a promissory note, the supreme court noted that the Code did
not apply because the collateral was real property. Instead the court
adopted section 132 of the Restatement of Security as the law of
Tennessee governing real estate collateral:
Where the creditor has security from the principal and knows of the surety's
obligation, the surety's obligation is reduced pro tanto if the creditor
(a)
(b)

surrenders or releases the security, or
wilfully or negligently harms it, or

12. See, e.g., Magnolia Homes Mfg. Corp. v. Montgomery, 451 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1971)
(release of collateral for an inadequate price discharges accommodation parties); Shaffer v.
Davidson, 445 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 1968) (failure to note a lien on the title certificate of a car
discharges accommodation parties).
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-3-606 (1964) provides in relevant part:
The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder (a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not
to sue any person against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of
recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such person the instrument or
collateral or otherwise discharges such person . . . or (b) unjustifiably impairs any
collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf of the party or any person against
whom he has a right of recourse.
14. Etelson v. Suburban Trust Co., 263 Md. 376, 283 A.2d 408 (1971) (note recited
indorsers' "consent to . . . the release or exchange of any collateral without notice .... ").
15. See, e.g., Nation Wide, Inc. v. Scullin, 256 F. Supp. 929 (D.N.J. 1966); Rushton v.
U.M.&M. Credit Corp., 245 Ark. 703, 434 S.W.2d 81 (1968); Lafayette Bank & Trust Co. v.
Silver, 58 Misc. 2d 891, 296 N.Y.S.2d 926 (App. Term 1969); cf. Wohlhuter v. St. Charles
Lumber & Fuel Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 812, 323 N.E.2d 134, aff'd, 62 Ill. 2d 16, 338 N.E.2d 179
(1975) (knowing acceptance of personal liability nullifies defense of unjustifiable impairment).
16. 503 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. 1973).
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(c) fails to take reasonable action to preserve its value at a time when
7
the surety does not have an opportunity to take such action.'

The court concluded that the bank had not impaired the collateral
because both parties were equally able to take the steps necessary
to protect it.'1
The May case has been followed in two subsequent Code cases.
In Tampa Bay Bank v. Loveday9 the president of a corporate debtor
personally indorsed the corporation's note to the bank. The business
subsequently folded, and the inventory, which the corporation had
put up as security for the loan, disappeared. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment against the corporation's president,"0 noting that as president she could have taken steps to protect
the collateral and that she was in a better position than the bank
to protect the collateral. Similarly, American National Bank v.
Henderson, ' an unreported case decided in 1975 by the Court of
Appeals for the Western Section, held that a bank's failure to see
that an automobile was insured did not discharge the accommodation indorsers when the car was wrecked.
The Tennessee rule is stricter, however, with respect to perfection of security interests. In Southern Credit Union v. Rucker 22 the
debtor Patten borrowed money from his credit union to buy a Corvette. The credit union obtained a security interest in the car and
the personal guarantee of three of Patten's co-workers. The credit
union then instructed Patten to re-title the car with a notation of
the credit union's lien. Instead Patten obtained a clear title and
used the title certificate to borrow from another lender, which properly noted its lien on the title. On Patten's default, the credit union
sued the indorsers. The court of appeals, citing section 47-3-606 of
the Tennessee Code, observed that the credit union "sen[t] a goat
17. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 132 (1941).
18. Comment c to § 132 adds the following: "The nature of the security may impose
upon the creditor duties to preserve its value so long as the creditor is the only person who
can conveniently take the appropriate action."
19. 526 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. App. 1974).
20. The trial court had found Loveday to be a maker of the note, rendering the discharge
issue moot since impairment does not discharge a maker but only an accommodation party.
Because the court of appeals found her to be an indorser and, therefore, a surety or accommodation indorser, it had to face the discharge issue.
21. Unreported cases were for a time in a limbo created by rule 31 of the rules of the
supreme court. Revised and entered on April 30, 1976, the rule provided, inter alia, that "all
unpublished opinions of any appellate court released prior to [April 30, 19761 shall not be
cited as precedent in any brief or other materials presented to any court." On March 2, 1977,
the supreme court, in response to arguments that this portion of the rule was impractical and
jurisprudentially unsound, deleted the quoted language.
22. (Tenn. Ct. App., Sullivan County Eq. Div., Oct. 25, 1974).
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to tend the cabbage patch" when it gave Patten the title papers.
The credit union's action amounted to an unjustifiable impairment
of the collateral and therefore released the co-signers from liability
on the note. Thus the Tennessee rule apparently discharges a surety
if the creditor fails to perfect its lien, but does not discharge the
surety if the surety could have performed the omitted act just as
23
easily as the creditor.
I1.

REPOSSESSION

When a debtor defaults, his secured creditor must decide
whether to attempt to take possession of the collateral. Sometimes
the nature of the collateral is such that repossession would be counterproductive. For example, if the collateral is highly specialized
equipment, the creditor may be better off allowing the debtor to
retain the equipment and to use it to generate the cash necessary
to pay off the debt. Usually, however, the secured party decides to
repossess, either for the purpose of coercing the debtor into suddenly
finding the money for the next installment or for the purpose of
selling the collateral and applying the proceeds against the debt.
The following portion of this Article sets out some of the methods
for and implications of repossession.
A.

Self-Help

The Code allows a secured party to take possession of his collateral from a defaulting debtor if he can do so without violence:
47-9-503.

Secured party's right to take possession after default.-Unless

otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of
the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by
action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may require the
debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party
at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient
to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under §47-9-504.24

Under prior Tennessee law, the conditional vendor could not
retake possession of his merchandise without judicial process absent
23. See also Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 8 UCC Rep. 399 (Tenn. App.
1970) (bank had not taken reasonable steps to preserve collateral).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-503 (1964). The right to repossess arises only upon
"default." Article 9 of the Code does not define "default." That question is left to the terms
of the security agreement. Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 168 S.E.2d 827
(1969). An acceleration clause is usually coupled with a default clause. For an excellent
discussion of the efficacy of such clauses, see 1 COOGAN,supra note 1, § 8.02[1l].
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a specific provision in the conditional sales contract granting him
that prerogative.15 Section 47-9-503 overrules prior law by giving the
secured party the right to repossess by self-help unless the security
agreement specifically negates it.
Doubt as to the constitutionality of the Code's approval of selfhelp arose in 1969 when the United States Supreme Court held
prejudgment garnishments of wages violative of due process because
the deprivation of wages occurred without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. 26 Three years later the Court found the Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes violative of the fourteenth
amendment on similar grounds." Armed with these cases, lawyers
have argued that section 9-503, by legislatively authorizing direct
action on the part of secured creditors without notice or an opportunity to'be heard, is the functional equivalent of a state replevin
statute and thus is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. Some
federal district judges have agreed with this analysis, 28 but the
''state action" argument has been rejected by at least six different
circuit courts, including the Sixth Circuit. The United States Su29
preme Court has refused to grant certiorari in all of these cases.
With the constitutionality of self-help repossession under section 9503 settled beyond reasonable doubt,3" the only qualification on the
25. See, e.g., Rice v. Lusky Furniture Co., 167 Tenn. 202, 68 S.W.2d 107 (1934); Mitchell v. Automobile Sales Co., 161 Tenn. 1, 28 S.W.2d 51 (1930); Morrison v. Galyon Motor Co.,
16 Tenn. App. 394, 64 S.W.2d 851 (1932). But see Third Nat'l Bank v. Olive, 198 Tenn. 687,
281 S.W.2d 675 (1955) (the Mitchell rule will not be extended to chattel mortgages).
26. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
27. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
28. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361
F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973). For more details on the background of these cases, see Note,
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.-The Repossession of Fuentes, 5 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 74 (1974).
29. Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1034 (1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1006 (1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.) (similar statute), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324
(9th Cir. 1973), rev'g sub nom. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502
F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, Civ. No.
C-73-50 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974), cited with approval in Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 n.6 (1974).
30. As Professor Gilmore points out, however, the constitutionality of self-help does not
make it safe:
In the financing of business debtors repossession causes little trouble or dispute. In the
underworld of consumer finance, however, repossession is a knockdown, drag-out battle
waged on both sides with cunning guile and a complete disregard for the rules of fair
play. A certain amount of trickery seems to be accepted: it is all right for the finance
company to invite the defaulting buyer to drive over to its office for a friendly conference
on refinancing the loan and to repossess the car as soon as he arrives. It is fairly safe for
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secured party's right is the requirement that self-help be conducted
31
without a breach of the peace.
B.

Actions to Recover PersonalProperty

Although Fuentes32 was not applied to self-help repossession, it3
has been applied with a vengeance to the Tennessee replevin law.
In 1972 a special three-judge federal court entered a decree, consented to by the Attorney General of Tennessee, declaring the Tennessee statutes authorizing replevin unconstitutional. The posthearing remedy of detinue, however, was left intact. 34 In 1973 the
Tennessee General Assembly responded to the decree with a new
statute35 drafted to comply with the requirements of Fuentes. The
statute created a new "action to recover personal property. ' '31 This
action is brought by filing a sworn complaint in a circuit or chancery
court, or a sworn civil warrant in general sessions court. The complaint or warrant must be accompanied by a copy of the security
agreement, must explain why the plaintiff is entitled to possession,
the finance company to pick up the car on the street wherever it may be parked, although
there is always a danger that the buyer will later claim that he had been keeping a
valuable stock of diamonds in the glove compartment. But the finance company will do
well to think twice before allowing its man to break into an empty house, even though a
well-drafted clause in the security agreement gives it the right to do exactly that. And
if the housewife, who is invariably pregnant and subject to miscarriages, sits on the sofa,
stove, washing machine or television set and refuses to move, the finance company will
make a serious mistake if he dumps the lady or carries her screaming into the front yard.
Juries love to award punitive damages for that sort of thing and the verdict will often
be allowed to stand.
2 GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1212-13.
31. Harris Truck & Trailer Sales v. Foote, 58 Tenn. App. 710, 436 S.W.2d 460 (1968);
Morrison v. Galyon Motor Co., 16 Tenn. App. 394, 64 S.W.2d 851 (1932). Professors White
and Summers have concluded that entry into the debtor's residence or garage without permission is ipso facto a breach of the peace. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
967-69 (1972). The secured party who repossesses too vigorously or in breach of the peace
opens himself to potential tort liability for trespass, assault and battery, conversion, or
invasion of privacy, and possibly to criminal penalties. Thrasher v. First Nat'l Bank, 288 So.
2d 288 (Fla. App. 1974); Stone Machinery Co. v. Keesler, 1 Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651
(1970) (sheriff accompanied secured party but without judicial process); WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra, § 26-13; Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 1016 (1971) (punitive damages); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 358
(1965).
32. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2301 to -2328 (1955).
34. Mitchell v. Tennessee, 351 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
35. 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 365, §§ 1-9, 11, 13 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 232341 to -2351 (Cum. Supp. 1976)). Chapter 365 also repealed those portions of the replevin
statute, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2301 to -2328 (1955), declared unconstitutional in Mitchell
v. Tennessee, 351 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972), but left unchanged those portions pertaining to detinue.
36. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-2341 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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and must describe and set forth the value of the collateral."7 Upon
filing of the complaint or warrant, the clerk is to issue process stating that a possessory hearing will be held before a judge or chancellor on a specified date. This hearing is not final nor on the merits,
but merely affords the plaintiff an opportunity to obtain a writ of
possession entitling him to gain physical possession of the property
pending trial on the merits. By posting a bond in an amount of the
value of the property, the plaintiff also may obtain from the judge
or chancellor (but not from the clerk) an order restraining the defendant from damaging, concealing, or removing the property from the
court's jurisdiction.3 8 The defendant may waive his right to the possessory hearing by giving the property to the sheriff or other officer
when process is served. 9
As an alternative to giving notice by service of process, the
plaintiff may begin his action by certified mail or by delivering to
the defendant notice of the time and place for the filing of the
application for a writ of possession. Such notice must be accompanied by a copy of the complaint and necessary attachments40 and
must be mailed or delivered at least five days before the hearing on
plaintiffs application for a writ. At the hearing the court must order
the issuance of an immediate writ of possession if it finds (1) that
the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property and (2) that the
plaintiff gave the defendant notice at least five days prior to the
hearing. The writ of possession, if issued, also serves as a summons
for the full hearing on the merits to be held at a later date.
Upon application by the plaintiff, the court may order an immediate writ of possession without notice to the defendant if it finds
that the property was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or
theft, or if it finds that the defendant is concealing the property, is
likely to remove the property from the jurisdiction of the court, is
likely to dispose of it, is endangering it by unusually hazardous use,
or is impairing the plaintiff's security interest by actions such as
failure to maintain hazard insurance. A writ of possession issued
pursuant to this section is conditioned upon the plaintiffs posting
of a bond in an amount fixed by the court. The amount of the bond
37. Id. § 23-2343.
38. Id. § 23-2345. In Knox County, the restraining order, by court rule, must be coupled
with an order directing the defendant to show cause why the restraining order should not be
continued and why the requested relief should not be granted. This rule has no statutory basis
but the procedure coincides with the general rules regarding ex parte and extraordinary relief.

See TENN. R. Civ. P. 65.
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-2344 (1973).
40.

Id. § 23-2346A(1).
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may be no less than the value of the property." Unlike the statutes
rejected by the Supreme Court in Fuentes,42 the Tennessee statute
requires (1) extraordinary circumstances and (2) a hearing before a
judge prior to the issuance of the writ. In upholding the constitutionality of this portion of the statute, a three-judge federal court43
pointed out that pre-hearing repossession is permissible only when
a lien holder who is in danger of losing his security posts a bond"
and obtains an order from a judge, rather than from a mere clerk
as was permitted by the statutes struck down in Fuentes.
In addition to seeking recovery of the property, the plaintiff
may include a prayer for recovery of the balance due on the underlying debt. Unfortunately, the General Assembly limited the availability of this dual remedy by providing that no deficiency judgment
may be obtained until the plaintiff has complied with "all requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code applicable thereto."4 5 Presumably, a judgment on the debt must await disposal of the collateral. The Act also increased the original jurisdiction of the general
sessions court by raising the maximum permissible dollar amount
for actions to recover personal property from 3,000 to 7,500."1 The
7,500 figure refers to the value of either the collateral or the debt,
and its effect is to bring mobile home transactions within the jurisdiction of the general sessions court.
C.

Bankruptcy Restraints on Repossession

The most potent restraint on the secured party's right to repossess his collateral arises when the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy. By virtue of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which became effective October 1, 1973, in both straight bankruptcy and
wage earner cases,47 the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, either by
41. Id. § 23-2346A(2).
42. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
43. Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974). The court relied on
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), in which the Supreme Court distinguished
its Fuentes holding that the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania were invalid
because they permitted sale of repossessed goods without notice or a Hearing and without
judicial order or supervision. In Mitchell the constitutional guarantee of procedural due
process was satisfied because the Louisiana law required, as a precondition to sequestration
of property from a defaulting debtor, that the creditor (1) furnish adequate security and (2)
make a specific factual showing to obtain judicial authorization. Id. at 605-06.
44. The court also referred to the provision allowing the award of punitive damages to
the defendant, including attorneys' fees, if the plaintiff wrongfully brings a possessory action
or fails to prosecute. TENN. CODa ANN. § 23-2350 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
45. Id. § 23-2348.
46. Id. § 19-301. See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
47. The rules of chapters I-VII and XIII were promulgated by the United States Su-
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a debtor or by one of his creditors, automatically places a moratorium on repossession of the debtor's property. Rule 601(a), applicable to straight bankruptcy cases provides:
Petition as Automatic Stay Against Lien Enforcement. (a) Stay Against
Lien Enforcement. The filing of a petition shall operate as a stay of any act
or the commencement or continuation of any court proceeding to enforce (1) a
lien against property in the custody of the bankruptcy court, or (2) a lien
against the property of the bankrupt obtained within 4 months before bankruptcy by attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable process or
proceedings.8

In straight bankruptcy cases, the stay is applicable only with
respect to (1) property in the bankruptcy court's actual or constructive possession49 and (2) judicial liens subject to invalidation under
section 67a of the Bankruptcy Act.5" The wage-earner stay is broader
and is effective even when the court is not in possession of the
property.5 1 Similar stays are incidental to the filing of petitions in
reorganizations,12 arrangements, 53 and real property arrangements. 5
Unless lifted by the bankruptcy court, the stay remains in effect
until the case is closed or dismissed, or until the property subject
to the security interest is abandoned, transferred, or exempted. Relief from the automatic stay may be obtained, however, by filing a
complaint in the bankruptcy court and thereby instituting an adpreme Court by order of April 24, 1973, 411 U.S. 989, pursuant to the authority vested in it
by 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970).
48. FED. RULE BANKR. P. 13-401(a), applicable to wage-earner cases, provides:
A petition filed under Rule 13-103 or Rule 13-104 shall operate as a stay of the commencement or continuation of any action against the debtor, or the enforcement of
any judgment against him, or of any act or the commencement or continuation of any
court proceeding to enforce any lien against his property, or of any court proceeding for
the purpose of rehabilitation of the debtor or the liquidation of his estate.
49. If the secured party has repossessed before filing a petition in straight bankruptcy,
so that he and not the debtor has possession of the collateral, he may safely ignore the stay
of rule 601 and proceed to foreclose. In re Magnum Opus Elec., Ltd., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 545
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). The notice to the debtor/bankrupt mandated by TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9504(3) must be given, however, to the trustee. In re Hughes, 12 UCC Rep. 982 (E.D. Tenn.
1973).
Under Tennessee law, if the foreclosure of a deed of trust is commenced prior to the filing
of the petition, the stay bars the sale because the property remains in the possession of the
bankrupt until it is sold by the trustee under the deed of trust. See FED. RULE BANKR. P. 601,
Advisory Committee's Note.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1970). The statute provides in substance that any nonconsensual lien on the bankrupt's property obtained by legal or equitable process within four months
of the filing of the petition may be set aside by the trustee.
51. Cf. In re Williams, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1304, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 1976) ("a Chapter XMI
court's power is founded on ownership by the debtor").
52. FED. RuLE BANKS. P. 10-601 (effective August 1, 1975).
53. FED. RULE BANKR. P. 11-44 (effective July 1, 1974).
54. FED. RuLE BANKR. P. 12-43 (effective August 1, 1975).
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versary proceeding.55
The "automatic" aspect of the stays deserves special attention
because a repossessing creditor might become ensnared inadvertently in the thicket of contempt. If the creditor attempts to repossess his collateral at any time after the petition in bankruptcy is
filed, he risks a contempt citation by the bankruptcy judge even
though he has no actual knowledge of the filing and acts in good
faith. Although the UCC abhors the secret lien, the bankruptcy
rules embrace the secret stay. The creditor's dilemma is best illustrated by the bankruptcy court's decision in In re Tallyn.56 In Tallyn
the bankrupt filed a petition on the morning of October 2. On October 3, the bank, acting without actual knowledge of the filing, repossessed the bankrupt's automobile. The bank subsequently sold the
car after contacting the trustee but without taking any action in the
bankruptcy court. In finding the bank in contempt of court and
assessing a fine of one hundred dollars, the bankruptcy judge made
these observations:
Few things are any clearer in bankruptcy: even a lien creditor may do
nothing on its own to enforce its lien. There is no automatic injunction [stay].
Frequently creditors will argue that they received no notice of bankruptcy, as
here, or that they repossessed the property before receipt of the notice from
the court. They feel they may do anything they wish until they receive a notice
from the Bankruptcy Court. This is not so!
Creditors must understand that the very "filing of a petition" activates
the injunction and notice has nothing whatsoever to do with it. Therefore, the
instant injunction fully obtained on October 2, 1974, at 9:20 a.m., without
notice.
Bankruptcy Rule 601 is an injunction [stay] which automatically goes
into effect at the moment of the filing of the petition. No notice for this purpose
is required. It is a lien creditor's duty and responsibility to ascertain whether
a bankruptcy petition has been filed and upon inquiry, even by telephone, the
Court will furnish that information relative to the name or names given by the
inquirer.
Here the lien creditor violated Bankruptcy Rule 601 in two respects:
1. Repossession of the vehicle after the filing of the petition and
2. Sale of the vehicle after the filing of the petition.
Let it clearly be noted that a lien creditor is not without remedy. He may
file a complaint for the recovery of his property and if entitled to the same,
upon entry of an order, may recover the property from both the trustee and
the bankruptY
55. FED. RuLE BANKR. P. 601(c). See FED. RULEs BANKR. P., Part VI, which apply the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court. In emergency situations, ex parte relief may be sought under FED. RuLE BANKR. P. 601(d). Similar
provisions are contained in the rules for rehabilitation chapter cases.
56. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 487 (E.D. Va. 1975).
57. Id. at 487, 488. Several recent cases have denied secured creditors the right to
repossess in chapter X cases when the debtor needs the collateral to operate or to make
reorganization possible. In re Yale Express System, Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967); In re
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D. Reclamation of Goods under Article 2
Conventional legal wisdom holds (a) that a seller on open account holds no enforcible lien in his merchandise once he parts
company with it and (b) that Article 9 of the Code exclusively
governs the rights of UCC lienors. Like so many other bits of conventional wisdom, these propositions have exceptions, the most important of which is the right of a defrauded seller to reclaim his goods
under section 2-702.58 Subsections (2) and (3) provide:
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten (10)
days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to
the particular seller in writing within three (3) months before delivery the ten
(10) day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the
seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or
innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights
of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor
under this chapter (§47-2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all
other remedies with respect to them. 9

The statute represents only a slight departure from the common law. Prior law in Tennessee and in numerous other jurisdictions provided that the seller of goods delivered on credit had the
power to rescind and recover the goods if the buyer fraudulently had
misrepresented his solvency." The Code continues this protection in
modified form. If a buyer receives goods while insolvent, the seller
may reclaim them by making a demand within ten days of the
buyer's receipt. No proof of misrepresentation or of intent not to pay
is required, but the power to rescind expires within ten days. The
ten-day limit does not apply, however, if the misrepresentation is
made in writing within the three-month period preceding delivery.,,
Thus speed on the part of the seller and his lawyer is essential,
Bermec Corp., No. 71-B-291 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971). In Yale

Express the court of appeals did not require the debtor to make payments equal to the
depreciation in value of the collateral. The case has been criticized as exceeding constitutional limits on the extent to which a secured creditor can be enjoined from repossessing
property, when he is not being compensated for its use. Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganization and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW.
15 (1974).

58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-702 (1964). For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the
conflict between § 2-702 and the Bankruptcy Act, see Sebert, The Seller's Right to Reclaim;
Another ConflictBetween the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act?, 52 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 219 (1976).
59. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-702 (1964).
60. Richardson v. Vick, 125 Tenn. 532, 145 S.W. 174 (1912); see 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES
§§ 636, 637 (1948). See also 1A COOGAN, supra note 1, at 1880.
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-702(2) (1964).
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although the process of actual repossession may be commenced at
a more leisurely pace if the demand is timely."2
Although the statute clearly acknowledges the right of the "defrauded" 3 seller to reclaim vis-a-vis the buyer, it also provides that
the seller's right to recover goods "is subject to the rights of a buyer
in the ordinary course"" or "other good faith purchaser or lien
creditor under this chapter (§ 47-2-403)."5 The Fifth Circuit in a
case with a tortured history held that the rights of a perfected secured party take priority over the rights of a reclaiming seller in the
same goods.6" On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit applied Kentucky law in In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc. and found that the seller's
right to reclaim takes priority over an attachment lien.67
A more common conflict has arisen between the reclaiming
seller and the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Judge
Clive Bare of the Eastern District of Tennessee, relying on Tennes5 that bankruptcy does
see law, held in In re Royalty Homes, Inc."
not cut off a seller's reclamation rights. The Third Circuit in In re
Kravitz" held for the trustee in bankruptcy against the sellers. Professor Hawkland has concluded that Kravitz was based upon the
peculiar local law of Pennsylvania and opined that, under the law
of most other states, the seller would prevail over a lien creditor and
perforce over the trustee in bankruptcy.7" Federal'sInc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp.,7 decided on April 19, 1977, provides addi62. In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Childress, 6 UCC
Rep. 505 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). Childress emphasizes that an intervening bankruptcy petition
in straight bankruptcy does not toll the ten-day period or excuse demand. The demand can

be made on the bankrupt or upon the receiver in possession of the goods. The rule applicable
to a petition under chapter XI is similar, although demand would be made on the debtor-inpossession or on the receiver.
63. The base line of subsection (2) is the proposition that any receipt of goods on credit
by an insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and, therefore, is fraudulent as against the particular seller. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-702, comment 2

(1964).
64.

Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-307(1) (1964).
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-702(3) (1964) (emphasis supplied); see English v. Ralph
Williams Ford, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 95 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1971).
66. In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (1976) (en banc), rev'g 510 F.2d 139 (1975);
accord, In re Daley, Inc., 17 UCC Rep. 433 (D. Mass. 1975).
67. 403 F.2d 658, 661 (6th Cir. 1968).
68. 8 UCC Rep. 61 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); accord, In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d

658 (6th Cir. 1968).
69. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
70. Hawkland, The Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and Defrauded Sellers-Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the Kravitz Case, 67 CoM. L.J.

86 (1962).
71. [Current] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 66,399 (6th Cir. 1977), rev'g In re Federal's Inc.,
402 F. Supp. 1357 (1975). Although the district court also had held that § 2-702 conflicts with
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tional support for that view. The Sixth Circuit, applying Michigan
law, held that a receiver in bankruptcy did not prevail over a seller's
reclamation petition even if he was viewed as an "intervening lien
creditor." The court looked to pre-Code Michigan law, as it did in
Mel Golde, and concluded that since a trustee as hypothetical judgment lien creditor acquires only such title to property as the debtor
had, a trustee's claim is subordinate to that of a reclaiming seller.
Therefore, the law seems clear, especially in the Sixth Circuit, that
72
the reclaiming seller prevails over the trustee.
E.

Rights of JuniorLien Holders to Compel Marshaling

A secured party's right to repossess his collateral may be frustrated by the holder of a junior security interest who invokes the
equitable principle of "marshaling of liens." In the usual case, the
secured party with the prior lien is entitled to possession as against
a secured party with a subordinate lien.73 The Code, however, also
provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions [of
the Code], the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement
its provisions. ' 74 One such principle is marshalinga rule which courts of equity sometimes invoke to compel a creditor who has
the right to make his debt out of either of two funds to resort to that one of
them which will not interfere with or defeat the rights of another creditor who
has recourse to only one of these funds. 5

The principle arose primarily in cases of land transactions and
has been explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court as follows: If
A has a mortgage on lots 1 and 2, and B levies on lot 2, chancery,
applying the marshaling doctrine, will require A to foreclose first on
lot 1 and satisfy his claim, insofar as possible, out of the proceeds
the Bankruptcy Act, the Sixth Circuit found no such conflict. See also In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975) (seller prevailed over trustee, and no conflict between
§ 2-702 and Bankruptcy Act was found).
72. Apparently the Code's Permanent Editorial Board agrees. In 1966 it amended § 2702 by deleting the language "or lien creditors" following "good faith purchaser" in the first
sentence of § 2-702(3). Tennessee has not yet adopted the proposed amendment, although
the 1972 amendments to the Code should be introduced into the General Assembly in late
1977 or early 1978.
73. Priorities are determined initially by reference to TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-312. The
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (amending I.R.C.
§§ 6323 & 6325), may have considerable impact on the question of priorities between the
secured party and the tax collector. For a comprehensive discussion of the Act, see 1 COOGAN,
supra note 1, at 1269-1322.
74. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-103 (1964).
75. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 283, 85 N.E. 59, 64 (1908).
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of lot 1 so as to give both A and B the maximum protection." The
principle should be equally applicable to conflicting secured parties. 7 It would behoove a junior lien holder to investigate a repossessing party's other collateral in order to protect his own security
interest.
IV.

DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL

Obtaining possession of the collateral is only half the battle.
One also must dispose of the collateral in a way that maximizes the
return to the secured party while avoiding the many pitfalls in the
Code." The remainder of this Article focuses upon the various restraints placed on the secured party's right to sell the collateral and
upon the consequences of his failure to comply with the standards
of the Code.
A.

Obligations While in Possessionof the Collateral

Section 9-2071- imposes certain duties on the secured party during the period between repossession and sale or at any time before
sale if the secured party has perfected his security interest by possession. Not surprisingly, he is required to "use reasonable care in
the custody and preservation of collateral in his possession" 8 -the
duty of a pledgee at common law.81 This duty cannot be disclaimed
or waived, 2 but the security agreement may spell out different standards of care that are not "manifestly unreasonable. 8 3 The collateral may be used or operated to preserve its value (for example, a
plant may be run in order to maintain its value as a going concern 4),
or it may be used in a manner authorized by the security agreement
or by a court of competent jurisdiction. A specific exception is made
under this section of the Code for consumer goods. 5 During the time
76. Parr, Nolen & Co. v. Fumbanks, 79 Tenn. 391, 394-95 (1883); accord, Gilliam v.
McCormack, 85 Tenn. 597, 4 S.W. 521 (1887). See generally G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES

377-79 (2d ed. 1962).

77. Cf. Hope v. Wilkinson, 82 Tenn. 21, 25 (1884).
78. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-9-504, 9-505, 9-507 (1964).
79. Id. § 47-9-207.
80. Id. § 47-9-207(1).
81. Id. § 47-9-207, comment 1.
82. Id. § 47-9-207, comment 4; § 47-9-501(3).
83. Id. § 47-9-501(3).
84. In Southern States Dev. Co. v. Robinson, 494 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. App. 1972), the
secured party took possession of and ran a manufacturing plant pursuant to a security agreement. He was held liable, however, to trade creditors for inventory sold and used while
running the operation.
85. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-207(4) (1964). Nevertheless, the collateral cannot be used
for an inordinate period. Moran v. Holman, 514 P.2d 817 (Alas. 1973).
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the secured party is in possession, the risk of loss remains with the
debtor to the extent of any deficiency in insurance coverage, but the
secured party has an obligation to insure." Any nonmonetary increase in the collateral may be held as additional security. Finally,
the collateral may not be commingled unless it is fungible."
B.

Retention in Satisfication

Although a foreclosure sale of the collateral usually follows repossession, the draftsmen of the Code observed that "[e]xperience
has shown that the parties are frequently better off without a resale
of the collateral ..... 81 Section 9-50590 embodies this alternative
by permitting the secured party, after default, to propose in writing
retention of the collateral as full satisfaction of the debtor's obligation. Again, however, an exception arises in the case of consumer
goods: if the debtor has paid sixty percent of the obligation secured
by the collateral, the secured party must dispose of it under section
9-504 within ninety days of taking possession unless the debtor has
waived his rights in writing after default."
Written notice of the secured party's proposal must be sent to
the debtor and, except in the case of consumer goods, also must be
sent to any other secured party who has properly filed a financing
statement or to any unperfected security interest holder of whose
interest the retaining party has actual notice. If no one objects
within thirty days, the secured party may retain the collateral in
satisfication of the debtor's obligation, without selling it"2 and without regard to its actual value. 3 If any secured party raises a timely
objection, of course, the creditor must dispose of the collateral in
accordance with the rules set forth below. Thus it is incumbent on
the secured party to search the records before giving such notice.
86. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(1), 2-509, 2-510 (1964); see Harvard Trust Co. v.
Racheotes, 337 Mass. 73, 147 N.E.2d 817 (1958).

87.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 47-9-207(2)(c) (1964).

88. Id. § 47-9-207(2)(d). For a comprehensive discussion of the creditor's rights ahd
duties regarding collateral in the secured party's possession, see 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, at
1127-80.
89. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-505, comment 1 (1964).
90. Id. § 47-9-505.
91. Id. § 47-9-505(1).
92. Id. § 47-9-505(2). Notice to junior lien holders is not required in consumer goods
transactions. Id.
93. Cerasoli v. Schneider, 311 A.2d 880 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973). The safeguard in such a
case is the right of the debtor to object and thereby to require sale of the collateral. Id.
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C. Sale of Collateral

The heart of part 5 of Article 9 is section 9-504,'1 which provides
a relatively flexible and simple guide to the disposition of collateral,
with the goal of producing the maximum possible amount from the
disposition. The draftsmen rejected the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act approach of detailed statutory regulation and opted for "a
loosely organized, informal, anything-goes type of foreclosure pattern, subject to ultimate judicial supervision and control . .

.-.

(1) "Commercially Reasonable"
Although the Code confers considerable discretion on the secured party when he sells the collateral, the Code imposes one overriding requirement. "[E]very aspect of the disposition including
the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially
reasonable."" The phrase "commercially reasonable" is not defined
in the Code, but its goal is to assure the highest possible realization
prices," for the benefit of both the secured party and the debtor.
The Code thus remits to the courts the task of determining appropriate standards.
These requirements place upon the creditor the good faith duty to the debtor
to use reasonable means to see that a reasonable price is received for the
collateral.
* * * Obviously, each case will turn on its particular facts. .

.

.Generally,

evidence as to every aspect of the sale including the amount of advertising
done, normal commercial practice in disposing of particular collateral, the
length of time elapsing between repossession and resale, whether deterioration
of the collateral has occurred, the number of persons contacted concerning the
sale, and even the price obtained, is pertinent."8

The Tennessee Court of Appeals has furnished certain additional guidelines. "The disposition shall be made in keeping with
prevailing trade practices among reputable and responsible business and commercial enterprises engaged in the same or a similar
business."" In response to clients who inquire how they should sell
94. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504 (1964).
95. 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1183.
96. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(3) (1964).
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504, comment 1 (1964); Dunham, Article 9 of the Revised
Uniform Commercial Code, Secured Transactions,1950 N.J. STATE BAR ASs'N YEARBOOK 91,
95; see 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 43.1.
98. Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prod., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 454-55, 535
P.2d 1077, 1080-81 (1975).
99. Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 111, 415 S.W.2d 347,
350 (1966). Professor Gilmore states that "It]he obligation on the secured party is to use his
best efforts to see that the highest possible price is received for the collateral." 2 GILMORE,
supra note 4, at 1234.
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their collateral, the author translates these rules by posing this
question: "Assuming you owned the collateral and wanted to sell it
for as much as you could get out of it, how would you sell it? Then
that's how to sell it." So far not a single client has responded that
he would take three bids from three automobile dealers or would
limit his advertising to a notice at the front door of the courthouse. 00
A sale is not ipso facto not "commercially reasonable" because
the sales price is too low, although according to the Clark Leasing''
case, price is one factor to' be considered. Indeed, section 9-507,1
states that the availability of a better price is not "of itself sufficient
to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner." Professor Epstein cautions, however, that, although
"low resale price alone is not enough, the primary issue in most
cases seems to be the sufficiency of the price . . . . [L]ittle more
than an unusually low resale price is needed to establish that the
'1
03
sale was not commercially reasonable.
In Tennessee a low resale price may even void the sale if the
courts extend the real property rule to chattels. In Jordan v.
Mosely'04 two houses and a lot worth sixteen thousand dollars were
bought at the foreclosure sale for two thousand dollars by the beneficiary of the trust deed. The court of appeals affirmed the chancellor's decision to set the sale aside and endorsed his conclusion that
the purchase at one-eighth of the property's value "would shock the
conscience of any right-thinking person. . . ." Although the Code
provides that such a purchaser takes free and clear of the debtor's
rights in the collateral, it requires the purchaser to act "in good
faith.' 105 A purchaser for an amount absurdly small in relation to
the value of the collateral may have great difficulty in establishing
his bona fides. 10
100. Old habits die hard, however. Although the Code has been the law of Tennessee
for 13 years, many creditors still seem content merely'to comply with the pre-Code noticeof-sale procedure, first enacted in 1889, that required advertising by printed poster at as many
as three public places in the county. 1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 81, § 1, at 117. That procedure
cannot be reconciled with the standards laid down in Mallicoat, and creditors relying on the
old forms are foreclosing on borrowed time.
101. Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prod., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 454-55, 535
P.2d 1077, 1080-81 (1975).
102. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-507(2) (1964).
103.

D. EPSTEIN, CONSUMER PROTECTON 312 (1976); see, e.g., Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo-

Doyle Co., 3 UCC Rep. 124 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1965). See also Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292
F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Goodin v. Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co., 249 Ark. 30, 458
S.W.2d 419 (1970); Franklin State Bank v. Parker, 136 N.J. Super. 476, 346 A.2d 632 (1975).
104. (Tenn. Ct. App., Knox County Eq. Div., April 14, 1973).
105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(4)(b) (1964).
106. For a discussion of the evidentiary considerations in establishing the relationship
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A question frequently posed by clients is whether the solicitation of sealed bids, or private sale, is an acceptable alternative to
sale by public auction. The question must be analyzed by asking
which of the two alternatives is more "commercially reasonable"
and by determining which type of sale would yield a higher return.
Professors White and Summers consider it "unwise to require a
public sale by auction if the same or a higher price can be obtained
by the submission of sealed bids. ' 17 The two commentators go on,
however, to caution that, whereas Article 9 does not require a specific number of bidders, "every single-bid sale invites scrutiny."
White and Summers conclude that "[l~t may well be that multiple
invitations to bid are a prerequisite of a commercially reasonable
sale."'' 8 Whichever route is chosen, a bona fide effort must be made
to advertise the sale properly and to solicit bidders,' 9 and a lawyer
inexperienced in auction sales should not conduct the sale."0 Perhaps the best approach is to sell the collateral in a manner recommended by persons experienced in selling similar items."'
One consideration in favor of a public, or auction, sale"' is
based upon the observation that many foreclosure sales actually
involve two sales. At the first sale, the secured party attempts to
comply with the technical requirements of the Code, such as giving
proper notice to the debtor, and then buys the property himself. If
the purchase price is less than the amount of the debt, the creditor,
having now "disposed" of the collateral, is entitled to a deficiency
claim against the debtor. For the second sale, the creditor fixes up
the collateral and uses the selling techniques best calculated to
maximize his return. Although one could argue that the effort that
went into the second sale should have gone into the first sale, secured parties will continue to seek the increased financial benefits
of the two-sale procedure as long as it is permitted. Therefore, the
first sale should be a public sale, because the secured party can buy
between price and value, see WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 31, at 989-92. Professor Gilmore
opines that, despite proper notification and publicity, if only the secured party appears at
the sale, he can bid the property in for 10% of its value and that, absent fraud, the transaction
should be unassailable. 2 GpmMoRE, supra note 4, at 1245. In light of Mosely, however, a higher
bid is recommended.
107. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 31, at 993.
108. Id. at 993-94.
109. See, e.g., California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1969); In re
Webb, 17 UCC Rep. 627 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
110. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Div. of Rucker Co., 540 F.2d 1375
(10th Cir. 1976).
111. See id.
112. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504, comment 1; § 47-2-706, comment 4 (1964).
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the collateral for himself only at a public sale unless the collateral
is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market, such as listed
stock, or is the subject of "widely distributed standard price quotations."

3

When the stakes are large enough, the secured party may desire
assurance that an intended sale will be commercially reasonable.
Section 9-507(2) provides the creditor a source of such assurance: "A
disposition which has been approved in any judicial proceeding or
by any bona fide creditors' committee shall conclusively be deemed
to be commercially reasonable." ' Note that the statute is applicable only to approval obtained prior to the sale."1 5
(2) "Notice to the Debtor"
Although the Code vests the secured party with considerable
discretion in arranging for the sale of the collateral, it does require
notice to the debtor of the time and place of the sale."6 The purpose
of these requirements is to enable the debtor to protect his interest
in the property by paying the debt, finding a buyer, or attending the
sale to bid on the property so that the property will not be sacrificed
at less than its true value.11 7 The Code does not specify the form of
the notice, although written rather than oral notice is probably
called for since the statute requires that notice be "sent.""' Certified or registered mail is the most desirable medium because it
provides: (1) a written record of the type of notice sent, (2) proof of
mailing, and (3) written proof of receipt if the debtor signs the
return receipt. All of these items are extremely valuable evidence if
the question of notice subsequently is litigated. In order to avoid the
plea that the registered letter never was picked up and that the
debtor thus did not receive actual notice of the sale, a copy of the
113. Id. § 47-9-504(3).
114. Id. § 47-9-507(2). Bryant v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 407 F. Supp. 360
(N.D. Ill. 1976); In re Zsa Zsa Ltd., 352 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (declaratory judgment held a
"judicial proceeding"), aff'd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
115. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-507, comment 2 (1964). But see Grant County Tractor Co.
v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 830, 496 P.2d 966 (1972) (determination may be made in a deficiency
suit).
116. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(3) (1964).
117. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Holt, 17 UCC Rep. 316 (Tenn. App. 1975). White and
Summers quite realistically refer to this goal as a "forlorn hope" the debtor will find money
or friends to bid. WrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 31, at 982.
118. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(3) (1964). But see Bondurant v. Beard Equip. Co.,
21 UCC Rep. 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); A.J. Armstrong Co. v. Janburt Embroidery
Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 246, 234 A.2d 737 (1967) (oral notice sufficient).
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notice should be sent to the debtor by ordinary first class mail. This
technique allows the creditor to take advantage of the evidentiary
presumption of delivery."'
The Code also requires that notice of the proposed sale be sent
to the "debtor." 1 0 The term includes not only the principal debtor
but also co-signers, co-makers, sureties, and guarantors-anyone
"who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured.' 21 Except when consumer goods form the collateral, notice
also must be sent to other secured parties who have interests in the
collateral evidenced by filed financing statements or whom the se122
cured party knows to have such interests.
Prior to default, the debtor cannot waive the notice requirement even in a business or commercial context.'2 The Code itself,
however, waives notice in three special situations: (1) when the
collateral is perishable; (2) when the collateral is of a kind threatening to decline in value rapidly, such as Christmas trees repossessed
on December 20; and (3) when the collateral is of a type customarily
sold on a recognized market, such as listed stock. 24 Nevertheless,
the prudent secured party will attempt to give notice even in these
circumstances if at all possible in order to avoid a later argument
over whether the collateral fits into one of the excepted categories.
The Code requires "reasonable" notification, but does not indicate when notice must be given in order to be "reasonable.' ' 2 5 The
parties may stipulate, as they often do in the security agreement,
what will constitute a reasonable period. Professor Henson argues
that- five-days' notice generally is recognized as reasonable, apparently because that phrase so often appears in security agreements.
119.

In light of the current performance of the United States Post Office, the presump-

tion of delivery perhaps is no longer realistic.
120. TENN. CODE ANN. §,47-9-504(3) (1964).
121. Id. § 47-9-105(1)(d). Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398

S.W.2d 538 (1966); Hepworth v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 323 So. 2d 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stagnaro, 25 Mass. App. Dec. 58 (1962).
122. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(3) (1964).
123. Ennis v. Atlas Fin. Co., 120 Ga. App. 849, 172 S.E.2d 482 (1969); C.I.T. Corp. v.
Haynes, 161 Me. 353, 212 A.2d 436 (1965); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Holt, 17 UCC Rep.
316 (Tenn. App. 1975). A debtor who voluntarily surrenders collateral under circumstances

suggesting that he does not care what happens to it, however, may be deemed to have waived
post-default notice. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast, 11 Wash. App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191
(1974); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972). The

prudent secured party still should give notice to avoid litigation of the waiver issue.
124.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(3) (1964). The disposition still must be commercially

reasonable. In addition, the "recognized market" exception does not apply to sellers of used
cars. WHrra & SuMMERS, supra note 31, at 984.
125. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(3) (1964).
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The reasonableness of notice is really a jury question and depends
upon the time a reasonably prudent debtor (perhaps a contradiction
in terms) would need to act to protect his interests. Henson suggests
that five days is reasonable only if the period is measured from the
time of anticipated receipt.'28 The better practice is to give at least
ten-days' notice, and prudence dictates two to three-weeks' notice
27
if the amounts involved are large.
The general rule requires only that the notice be properly
posted and addressed, not that it be received.12 8 The Tennessee
Court of Appeals modified the general rule, however, in Mallicoat
v. Volunteer Finance and Loan Corp.'21 In Mallicoat the creditor
mailed written notification to the debtor. Although the letter was
returned undelivered, the creditor sold the collateral. The court held
that the creditor had not given proper notice because the creditor
knew where the debtor worked, where his parents lived, and that the
debtor had not received the notice. The court emphasized the creditor's affirmative duty to follow up on notice that comes back unopened. A secured party in Tennessee, therefore, is well advised to
try to assure that his debtor actually receives notice of the sale. 3 °
The contents of the notice depend upon whether the sale is to
be public or private. If it is to be private, the notice must specify
only the time after which a private sale or disposition will be
made. 3 ' For a public sale, the notice must set forth the exact date,
32
time, and place of the sale.'
If the debtor has been adjudicated a bankrupt at the time notice is sent, the creditor also must notify his trustee in bankruptcy.
In In re Hughes'3 3 the secured party, a finance company, repossessed
a car, in which it held a valid security interest, one day after Hughes
had filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Although it subsequently learned of the bankruptcy, the creditor proceeded to sell the
car without leave of the bankruptcy court or notice to the trustee.
126. R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS §§ 10-11, at 248-49 (1973).
127. Two days certainly is inadequate. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Ferris, 9 UCC Rep. 899
(Mich. Dist. Ct. 1971); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402
(1971).
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-201(38) (1964); Randolph v. Franklin Inv. Co., 21 UCC
Rep. 348 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977); Steelman v. Associates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649,
175 S.E.2d 62 (1970); Hawkins v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 250 Md. 146, 242 A.2d
120 (1968).
129. 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966).
130. Accord, In re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973).
131. TEN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(3) (1964).
132. Id.; J.T. Jenkins Co. v. Kennedy, 45 Cal. App. 3d 474, 119 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1975);
Jones v. Garcia, 538 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
133. 12 UCC Rep. 982 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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The bankruptcy judge held that section 9-105(1)(d) of the Code' 3'
and section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act15 required that notice of the
time, place, and terms of the sale be given to the trustee. The
finance company did not give notice to the trustee, and, accordingly, was held liable to the trustee for the interest on the note plus
ten percent of the principal pursuant to section 9-507(1) of the
Code.'
(3)

"Application of Proceeds of Disposition"

Pursuant to section 9-504(1) of the Code, proceeds from the
disposition of the collateral are distributed in the following order:
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, selling
and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the
secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under
which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest in the collateral if written notification of demand therefor is received
before distribution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by the secured
party, the holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish
reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party need
not comply with his demand.'37

Subsection (a) includes commercially reasonable expenses incurred in preparing the collateral for sale.' 38 Some authority supports the proposition that a secured party is obligated in certain
instances to condition or maintain collateral in his possession,' 39 but
generally the courts permit the secured party to sell the collateral
in the condition it was in at the time of repossession. "' In Tennessee
the parties may provide for attorneys' fees in the security agreement, but the amount thereof is within the reserved discretion of the
trial court. Appellate courts will not interfere with the amount set
by the trial court unless some injustice has been perpetrated."'
Subsection (b), satisfaction of the debt secured, should pose no
problem to the secured party and therefore deserves no discussion
134.

135.
136.
137.

138.
139.
140.

§ 47-9-105(1)(d) (1964).
11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-507(1) (1964).
TENN. CODE ANN.

Id. § 47-9-504(1)(a)(c).

Id.; Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co., 535 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972).
Eaton, Yale & Towne v. Sherman Indus. Equip. Co., 316 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Mo.

1970); Goodin v. Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co., 249 Ark. 30, 458 S.W.2d 419 (1970).

141. Dole v. Wade, 510 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. 1974); Harpole v. Bank of Dyer (Tenn. Ct.
App., Gibson County Eq. Div., Aug. 5, 1975).
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here. The third category, satisfaction of subordinate security interests, is more vexing. A junior secured creditor, whose lien is discharged by the sale, 1 2 can participate in the distribution only if he
delivers to the selling secured party a written notification of a demand for his share and if he furnishes, upon request, reasonable
proof of his security interest.' An electrostatic copy should suffice.
Finally, the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency.'
D.

Consequences of Failureto Comply with Disposition Rules

If the secured party fails to comply with the Code standards for
disposition of collateral, for example, by failing to give proper notice
or by failing to sell in a commercially reasonable manner, a number
of courts will punish him by denying the right to a deficiency judg4 5 This
ment.1
arbitrary approach was rejected by the Tennessee
Court of Appeals in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Holt.' In Holt
Commercial Credit Corporation had failed to give notice of the sale
of collateral to Holt, the debtor. Judge Drowota, in a lucid and wellreasoned opinion, set out a more flexible rule for violations of the
Tennessee Commercial Code standards. He summarized the law as
follows: In seeking a deficiency, (a) the creditor must prove, as part
of his case-in-chief, that he complied with the notice and
commercially-reasonable requirements of section 47-9-504(3); (b) if
the plaintiff does not satisfy the trial court that he has complied,
the defendant is entitled to a set-off or credit against the deficiency;
(c) the set-off is the difference between what was received and what
would have been received had the plaintiff complied with the Code;
and (d) the difference will be presumed to be at least the amount
of the deficiency unless the creditor proves otherwise.
The Code sets out a special rule for failure to comply with
notice and commercial reasonableness in consumer goods transactions. Section 47-9-507(1) gives the debtor the right to recover, in
any event, the finance charge plus ten percent of the principal or
cash price. Note that the debtor might recover a sum substantially
greater than his actual loss as calculated in Holt, since the penalty
142. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-504(4) (1964).
143. Id. § 47-9-504(l)(c).
144. Id. § 47-9-504(2).
145. For a collection of these cases and a trenchant analysis of the reasoning (or lack of
reasoning) of the various courts, see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 31, at 1000-07.
146. 17 UCC Rep. 316 (Tenn. App. 1975).
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is calculated on the basis of the original principal and total finance
charge.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Code provides a host of judicial and nonjudicial remedies
for the secured creditor. The remedies are flexible and calculated to
protect the interests of both the debtor and the secured party. The
penalties for noncompliance, however, can be substantial. Therefore, the secured creditor is well advised to familiarize himself with
the intricacies of the statute and to follow them carefully. Compliance with the Code is an absolute defense.

